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1 Introduction
This paper addresses an area of debate around the applicability of the canonical model for
decisions under uncertainty in which risk preferences are assumed to be context-invariant.
The assumption of context-invariance of risk preferences allows the use of external (to
context) measures of risk preferences as proxies in models where individuals make all risky
decisions using the same utility function over wealth. For example, in the case of insurance,
multiple choices over different risky insurance dimensions taken by the same individual
should reflect the same degree of risk aversion even if the contexts of decision making are
different. In contrast there is important literature mostly related to behavioural economics
which poses serious concerns on the internal validity of this assumption (Rabin 2000; Rabin
and Thaler 2001). They argue that an individual’s decision to bear risk is influenced by the
context of choice and support this argument through lab experiments showing little or no
significant commonality between risky choices. As a result one would need to impose more
theoretical assumptions to extend risk preferences estimated in one market to another.
Our paper aims at providing evidence that informs this discussion through a new empirical
framework applied to the demand for insurance.
In applying it to the study of insurance demand, this paper also considers the critical
area of heterogeneity in preferences for insurance. The literature around the determinants
of insurance demand has been mainly developed in the analysis of asymmetric information.
Many studies provide evidence of equal or greater importance of unobserved heterogeneity
in determining the demand for insurance than risk type - Cutler et al. (2008); Finkelstein
and Poterba (2004, 2014) in the annuity market; Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) in long-
term care markets; Cawley and Philipson (1999), Inkmann and Michaelides (2012) in life
insurance markets.
This paper proposes a unique approach to bring these two areas together in our em-
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pirical framework. It answers three questions. First, what heterogeneity is identifiable in
demand for multiple insurance? Second, is there stability of unobserved risk preferences
across the different insurance domains ie we test for domain general components? Third,
are there non-preference factors that show greater commonality in risk tolerance for similar
domains? Specifically, we study four insurance purchase decisions amongst elderly people
in the Health and Retirement Survey - Medigap, long-term insurance, life-insurance and
annuities. These choices all involve financial risk and are economically meaningful to our
sample of elderly. In addition the four insurance types vary in their similarity to each other.
For example, Medigap and long-term insurance are closer in objective than annuities and
life insurance. This provides a degree of variety in domains to test the generality of prefer-
ences, but it also allows identification of any context-specificity that may arise from closer
domains.
The issue of multiple insurance choices and domain invariant risk preferences has re-
ceived attention in several recent papers. Standard economic theory predicts that indi-
vidual risk preferences are stable across decision contexts. Many studies have found the
existence of a common, but small, element of domain-general risk preferences (see for ex-
ample Barsky et al. 1997; Dohmen et al. 2011; Kimball et al. 2008), while several other
studies based on laboratory experiments and hypothetical money gambles showed that
context is the most important factor (see Kahneman 2003a- 2003b).
Our paper builds on more recent work in the area of domain generality of components
(DGC). Different approaches have been adopted in the literature to test the hypothesis of
stable preferences. Cohen and Einav (2007) and Barseghyan et al. (2011) model individual
choice following standard expected utility theory and use insurance data on deductible
choices to estimate risk aversion parameters in the sample by comparing the variation in
the deductible menus across individuals and their choices from these menus. Einav et al.
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(2012) propose another approach focusing on within-person correlation between insurance
domains. They use data on employee benefit choices for five different employer-provided
insurance domains. To obtain the individual rank correlation, they use multivariate regres-
sion to estimate residual correlation between domains and use as controls individual risk
occurrence factors. They find a small effect of risk controls on the correlation pattern and
a statistically significant residual correlation between 401(k) and insurance. Thus, they
conclude that correlations are more likely to capture correlation in underlying risk aversion
and that risk preferences are likely to be stable across domains.
In this paper we propose an alternative framework to examine how general risk pref-
erences are in multiple domains of insurance. Our approach extends the previous setting
focused on residual correlation across insurance types (Einav et al. 2012) by identifying,
using a latent class analysis (LCA), unobservable “types” with different risk preferences
and examining the effect of these “types” on insurance purchase decision. Our approach
identifies different groups of individuals based on their degree of risk aversion using a
common underlying unidimensional unobservable variable. The test for DGC in our ap-
proach is a test of monotonicity of this variable across the different insurance purchases.
In addition we model separately from unobserved risk preferences the residual correlation
between insurance choices potentially introduced by non-preference factors. Our results
show the existence of a stable pattern of individual risk preferences over different insur-
ance domains, which supports the DGC hypothesis. We also corroborate the findings in
Einav et al. (2012), that context plays an important role in determining insurance choices
particularly when insurance coverage decisions involve similar specific contexts.
The paper is organized as follow. The next section reports a brief overview of insurance
markets we are analysing and describes the data; section 3 presents the model. Section 4
and 5 report respectively the main findings and some concluding remarks.
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2 Data and Setting
We use individual-level data from the fifth wave of the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS) to study four private-insurance purchase decisions in the 2002 cohort. Given that
our interest is in the study of heterogeneous risk preferences relating to insurance purchases
and the domain-generality of risk tolerance we exploit the panel nature of the data set to
track realized individual risk essential to our analysis.
The first measure of insurance we use is whether an individual has a Medicare supple-
mental health insurance. This is often named Medigap, since it is specifically designed to
cover “gaps” of coverage (e.g. high out-of-pocket expenses) left by Medicare. Medigap-
private health insurance plans offer coverage only for individuals over 65 years, we exclude
from the sample all individuals who are below this age threshold in 2002. In addition
we focus on individuals who have deliberately purchased supplemental insurance since our
interest is on the demand for insurance (see Fang et al. 2008). Thus we exclude those who
received coverage by a former employer or spouse and who have free access by other public
funded programs such as Medicaid or Tricare. The remaining insurance purchase decisions
are: life insurance, annuities and long-term care. These are important financial risks for
elders. These markets, differ from the Medigap market in that they are not subject to
heavy regulation and thus insurance companies are free to price contracts according to
individual riskiness. After eliminating missing observations the sample consists of 4303
observations. Our sample has an equal proportion of men and women. More than half
of whom own supplementary health insurance and are covered by life insurance. More
descriptive statistics and definitions of other variables are reported in Table 1.
Standard economic approaches to insurance purchase model insurance choices as being
driven by risk and risk aversion. Our main interest in this paper is the study of risk aversion
and the pattern of risk preferences across insurance domains. This requires us to control
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for risk in order to make inferences about risk aversion. In our set of control variables we
include proxies for observed individual risk for each of the insurance domains. We follow the
literature Einav et al. (2012), Cutler et al. (2008) and Finkelstein and McGarry (2006)
in accounting for observed risk and control for two components of risk - predicted risk
using observables and idosyncratic risk. The latter is specific to each individual. To proxy
for this risk we exploit the dynamic structure of the data and include realized risk in a
subsequent period. The identification is based on similar arguments as used by Cohen and
Einav (2007) where conditional on predicted risk generated from observables, realized risk
from a following coverage period can be included as a (imperfect) proxy for an individual’s
specific risk type. The second issue of unobserved heterogeneity means individuals may
differ from each other in their underlying unobserved risk preferences creating selection
effects if this unobserved heterogeneity is not controlled. Our approach to the issue of
unobserved heterogeneity arises from the structure of our empirical model and we address
this issue in the following section.
2.1 Risk Indicators
In this section we discuss the set of controls included in the model to capture ’predicted
risk’ as defined by the information insurers collect and use in pricing contracts. These vary
by the type of insurance being purchased. As guidance in the choice of these controls we
follow previous studies on demand for insurance (see for example Cutler et al. 2008; Cohen
and Einav 2007; Cohen and Spiegelman 2010).
In the Medigap market there is a free enrollment period which lasts for six months after
an individual turns 65 years old and is enrolled in Medicare. During this period Medigap
cannot refuse any person even if there are pre-existing conditions and pricing is based on
age, gender and smoking status. Thus our first three controls for predicted risk are an
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individual’s age, gender and smoking status. In addition we include dummy variables for
census division of residence. In the other three insurance categories we include marital
status in addition to age and gender. Finally, in the case of annuities, we also include
spouse’s age and an interaction term between spouse’s age and marital status.
In addition to demographics insurers in the long-term care and life insurance markets
also use indicators of health status. We include in our model three indicators of health.
The number of limitations in performing ’Activities of Daily Living (ADLs)’, a similar indi-
cator for ’Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL)’and number of doctor diagnosed
illnesses. Life insurance and annuity classification depends on age and gender, although
the premium for the former is also related to health status and on the size of policy the
applicant is considering.
As discussed above, in addition to predicted risk we also include measures of realized
(ex-post) risk. We use data from two subsequent waves (2003-2006) of the survey to
construct measures of realized risk. For Medigap we use measures of ex post healthcare
utilization. We include three measures for the period 2004-06, number of inpatient hospital
visits, number of outpatient hospital visits and number of doctor’s visits not including the
previous two categories. Clearly ex-post moral hazard can affect this measure, however
it should be less effective when one considers subsequent utilization over a longer period
and use it to model previous individuals’ insurance choice decisions (see Cohen and Einav
2007). For the life insurance market and annuities we use whether an individual is still alive
in the subsequent two waves. Finally for long-term insurance our measure is the number
of nursing home stays in the following waves.
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2.2 Risk Tolerance Indicators
Our primary focus in this paper is on risk preferences and their generality across domains.
In order to identify risk groups based on unobserved preferences, we use a set of proxies
(observable manifestations of risk preferences which affect insurance choices). Our set of
indicators is: job-based mortality risk, receipt of preventive health care, no risky portfolio
choice, number of jobs the respondent reports having through job history, the subjective
probability to live over a certain age, level of education and a composite indicator of health
related behaviors.1
Our first binary indicator is job-based mortality risk (job-mort). Following Cutler et
al. (2008) we derive the mortality rates from Viscusi (2004) and assign mortality rates in
our sample using industry-occupation cells (or occupation alone) and current job (if any),
including self employment. If the respondent is not employed in the 2002 HRS, we then
use the last available job information. Missing values for this variable are assigned if the
individual has never held a job or if it is not possible to identify either job or industry
code.
Portfolio decisions and the demand for risky assets are important dimensions of risk
aversion. We define an individual as holding less risky assets if s/he has a positive value of
financial assets and the share of portfolios invested in Treasury bills and savings accounts
is greater than those invested in stock. Therefore we set no-risky-assets equal to 1 if indi-
vidual has no risky assets, 0 otherwise. However we acknowledge that since information on
financial assets are collected at the household level and no information on asset ownership
within the household is available, this measure could to some extent reflect risk preferences
1Our main specification uses the 2002 cohort and variables measured in this year. One potential problem
is that of reverse causality, for example individuals without insurance may be more likely to exercise more.
To check if this is a problem we estimate our model using risk tolerance indicators measured in 2000 (and
insurance purchase in 2002). We find very similar results for both specifications. The year 2000 results are
available upon request.
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of the household rather than an individual.
Our next indicator is derived from an individual’s job history. Guiso and Paiella (2005;
2008) show the existence of a negative relationship between the decision to leave a job and
risk aversion. They argue that leaving a sure and known prospect for a new unknown one
could imply willingness to incur new risks. Therefore the indicator (job-num) equals 1 if
individual had a number of jobs lower than the median during his/her job history, and 0
otherwise.
Another binary indicator is the self-reported probability of living to a given age (prlife).
This question in the survey varies with an individual’s age. Respondents 75 years or
younger are asked to report the probability of living to age 75, while individuals over 75
years, are asked to report the probability of living to age 100. Risk aversion could also
be related to individual level of education since being more risk-averse can translate into
lower investment on education (see for example Guiso and Paiella 2005; 2008). Individual
education indicator is defined as a binary variable (education) which takes 1 if an individual
has years of education higher than the median.
The last two binary indicators measure: an individual’s attitude to health-related life
styles (healthb) which equals 1 if the respondent has a BMI between 18-30, has less than
three drinks per day; and preventive which measures the fraction of gender-appropriate
preventive health activity undertaken by individual. Activities include: a flu shot, a blood
test for cholesterol, a check of her breasts for lumps, a mammogram or breast x-ray, a Pap
smear and a prostate screen Cutler et al. (2008) and Finkelstein and McGarry (2006).
3 The Model
Our main aim in this paper is to test for domain general components in individual risk pref-
erences across purchases of different kinds of insurance. In addition, we examine the extent
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to which context specificity or non-preference factors determines correlation in residuals
across insurance types. In our model an individual is assumed to make purchase decisions
in each of j insurance domains. Let Ij denote a binary variable which takes value 1 if
an individual has purchased insurance in the insurance domain j, with j = 1, . . . , J and
let P represent a random variable which describes individual risk preferences. Then the
probability of purchasing insurance can be written as:
Pr(I1 = 1 | w1, P )
...
Pr(IJ = 1 | wJ , P )
(1)
The question is how the joint distribution of the observables (I1, . . . , IJ), conditional on
w, is affected by the attitude to buying insurance in the presence of the unobservable P .
If preferences P were also observable, then one could easily test the DGC hypothesis after
controlling properly for wj by examining any variations in the direct effect of P on the
insurance purchase decisions across domains.
To develop this further, assume that risk preferences are specific to an insurance domain,
then there is no underlying P that is common across the j domains of insurance. In this
case the decision process can be represented with a system of equations with individual
risk preferences approximated such that equation (1) can be written as:
Pr(I1 = 1 | w1, P1)
...
Pr(IJ = 1 | wJ , PJ)
(2)
Hence and individual’s willingness to bear risk in one insurance domain is different from
his/her willingness to bear risk in other contexts. However in both equation (1) and
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equation(2) P is not directly observable.
3.1 Empirical strategy - multivariate logit model
A strategy to evaluate the extent to which unobserved individuals’ risk aversion displays
a common component across domains, is to examine the correlation in individual’s choices
from among the insurance options in each domain. In this framework Einav et al. (2012)
propose to study the correlation structure after controlling for some covariates important
in explaining insurance choice and test the null of DGC by simply testing the independence
between these insurance choices.
To better explain this strategy, first notice that since standard economic theory models
insurance choices as driven by risk and risk aversion, it is essential to control for risk if
the aim is to make inferences about risk aversion. Although many studies indicate that
heterogeneity in risk preferences plays a much greater role than heterogeneity in risks
in explaining the heterogeneity in insurance coverage choices (Cohen and Einav 2007;
Barseghyan et al. 2011), to proxy for the predictable component of risk w1, . . . ,wJ , we
use two sets of measures. The first one includes all observable characteristics used by
insurer to predict individual actual risk (xj), while the second is a set of proxies measuring
subsequent risk to capture potential sources of risk unmeasured by insurer (rj) (see e.g
Cohen and Einav (2007), Cutler et al. 2008; Einav et al. 2012). Now if P could be observed
and varying across domains, then equation (2) can be rewritten as:
I1 = 1(α(P1) + x
′
1β1 + r
′
1γ1 + ξ1 > 0)
...
IJ = 1(α(PJ) + x
′
JβJ + r
′
JγJ + ξJ > 0)
(3)
where with 1(.) denoting the indicator function, and ξ1 . . . , ξJ being idiosyncratic errors
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with continuous c.d.f F . However P cannot be directly observabled, thus a standard
approach is to estimate model 3 by using a multivariate logit (probit) model:
I1 = 1(x
′
1β1 + r
′
1γ1 + 1 > 0)
...
IJ = 1(x
′
JβJ + r
′
JγJ + J > 0)
(4)
with 1, . . . , J being error terms with specific correlation structure determined by the link
function F (probit/logit). To understand how this strategy works in practice, consider a
case with only two insurance choices (j,k) and assuming a probit link function, with j and
k being standard normal errors with correlation ρ capturing residual association. Then
taking into account model (3), j and k can be written as j = Pj + ηj and k = Pk + ηk,
with ηj , ηk uncorrelated idiosyncratic errors. The null of no DGC amounts to testing ρ = 0.
In other words if j and k are correlated, then Pj and Pk affect similarly the individual
attitude of buying insurance.
A similar approach can be followed using a standard logit link function, which can be
more flexible in the modeling of the residual correlation among insurance choices (Dar-
danoni et al., 2014). To see how the logit works, suppose the errors j have a standard
logistic distribution but with unspecified association structure through the use of a copula.
Thus the system of equations (4) can be written as:
pi(w) = g [λ(w)] = g (α+Wβ) . (5)
where pi is the vector of probabilities describing the joint distribution (I1, . . . , Ij), the el-
ements of W are known functions of the vector of all covariates (w1, . . .wJ) and λ(w)
is the vector of all the marginal loglinear parameters describing the joint distribution of
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(I1, . . . , IJ). To better understand the role of these parameters, in the case of our multi-
variate dichotomous decisions of insurance purchases, λ(w) can be partitioned into com-
ponents, the first part relating to the univariate marginal distributions relating to each
insurance purchase decision and a second part that relates to the joint distributions be-
tween each of two insurance purchase decisions, which determines the correlation structure
between the error terms. This split can be represented as follows:
λ(w) =
 λa(w)
λρ(w)

 αa +W aψa
αρ
 (6)
where αa, W a and ψa represent the intercepts and regression coefficients relating to the
univariate component while αρ describe the association across the insurance decisions. The
association component when separated out from the univariate component allows modeling
the association between the errors in each of the J insurance purchase equations. Thus
the link function we use has two main properties. First, each univariate distribution I1...Ij
is determined by a set of logits which assume j have a logistic distribution. Second,
each bivariate distribution Ii, Ij is determined by a bivariate interactions called global log-
odds ratios (λρ) that capture the association between the insurance types. Therefore if
(I1, . . . , IJ) are independent, then the model (6) is simply reduced to the estimation of J
separate logit models, one for each λa(w). On the other hand when (I1, . . . , IJ) are not
assumed to be independent, the vector λρ consists of
(
J
2
)
global log-odds ratios.2 In our
specific case the vector λρ parameters has dimension 6 × 1, namely one for each of the
following associations: supplemental insurance-annuity λs,a, supplemental insurance-long-
term care λs,l, supplemental insurance-life insurance λs,li, long-term care - life insurance
λl,li, long term care - annuities λl,a and annuities- life-insurance λli,a. These global log-odds
2Dardanoni et al. (2014) provide a more general framework to estimate a multivariate logit model when
dependent variables are ordinal variables.
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ratios can be interpreted as:
λIj ,Ik = log
(
Pr(Ij=0,Ik=0)Pr(Ij=1,Ik=1)
Pr(Ij=1,Ik=0)Pr(Ij=0,Ik=1)
)
= αIj ,Ik (7)
with j, k = 1, . . . , J . Following Einav et al. (2012), the hypothesis of DGC can be simply
tested by looking at the correlations from the multivariate regression model described
above. In general, by rejecting the null hypothesis of a correlation of zero (H0 : λIj ,Ik = 0)
for each of the
(
J
2
)
binary associations between (I1, . . . , IJ), one can reject the null of no
domain-general component of insurance choice, and then insurance choice in every other
domain has some predictive power for individual’s choice in a given domain.
However the rejection of the null hypothesis may be viewed as hardly surprising since it
can be subjected to the important caveat that non-preference factors may introduce corre-
lations across domains. Particularly in the case of insurance, potential residual correlation
can be related to underlying (unpriced) risk across the insurance domains uncaptured by
proxyw or more simply to context specificity related to the fact that some insurance choices
may be simply complementary to another one (e.g health and long-term care insurance).
Therefore it is possible that residual correlation is more likely related to non-preference fac-
tors related to the specific context of insurance choice rather than to a general component.
This issue points directly to the fact that the “true” unobserved structure underlying indi-
vidual risk preferences is much more complex and relying on a single statistic looking at the
correlation between insurance choices, without distinguishing between context specificity
and general component may be limited in scope to test the DCG hypothesis.
3.2 Empirical strategy - extended latent class analysis
The approach we propose also studies association across residuals but take a different ap-
proach to the multivariate logit (probit) regression used in Einav et al. (2012). In particular
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our strategy provides first a clear structure of the underlying unobserved heterogeneity in
risk preferences modeling separately the part of correlation related to risk preferences from
the part related to context specificity (non-preferences factors). Second we develop a clear
testing procedure of DGC hypothesis through the use of some recent developments in finite
mixture models and marginal modeling with inequality constraints Bartolucci et al. (2007).
Following on from the earlier discussion we assume that differences across risk prefer-
ences P are discrete (a fairly innocuous assumption since any continuous variable can be
approximated arbitrarily well by a discrete one). Then we can cross-classify them into a
single discrete variable P ∗ which identifies the set of heterogeneous “types”. These groups
of P ∗ can be represented as a single discrete unobserved variable that takes on different
values m where m = m1 × .... × mJ . An interpretation of the different groups or latent
classes could be degrees of risk aversion - ie differences among “types” are driven by differ-
ent attitudes to bearing risk. Thus conditional on his risk group an individual purchases
different insurance products. Our hypothesis of commonality of preferences focuses on the
extent to which an individual’s choices within a group are representative of the group he
or she belongs to. Intuitively, if a set of individuals belong to a highly risk averse group
then their probability of purchasing insurance must be consistently higher across all insur-
ance types when compared to groups who are less risk averse. More formally, our test for
the generality of preferences across insurance domains can be viewed as testing the null
hypothesis that there is a single underlying unobservable variable P ∗ such that choices are
monotonically dependent on it. Thus for some arrangement of the m types of P ∗:
Pr(I1 = 1 | w1, P ∗ = 1) ≤ · · · ≤ Pr(I1 = 1 | w1, P ∗ = m)
...
Pr(IJ = 1 | wJ , P ∗ = 1) ≤ · · · ≤ Pr(IJ = 1 | wJ , P ∗ = m)
(8)
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In terms of system (3), this is similar to testing the null that:
α1(P
∗ = 1) ≤ α1(P ∗ = 2) ≤ · · · ≤ α1(P ∗ = m)
...
αJ(P
∗ = 1) ≤ αJ(P ∗ = 2) ≤ · · · ≤ αJ(P ∗ = m)
(9)
Since the label of the types is arbitrary, no order is assumed on P ∗, thus if the hypoth-
esis (equation 9) cannot be rejected this means that an unobserved types m shows the
same attitude of buying insurance across domain as compared with all the other unob-
served types and then risk preference P are general across domains. In other words if and
individual is willing to bear more risk in insurance domain j as compared to domain k,
then risk preferences Pj and Pk would affect differently insurance choice and P
∗ would be
multidimensional rejecting the null hypothesis (equation 9) of DGC.
To test this empirically the approach we propose relies on a latent class model. Let
then U be a random variable with support in 1, 2, . . . , t which cross-classifies all relevant
unobserved heterogeneity. We then need to estimate:
I1 = 1
(
t∑
u=1
α1(u)U(u) + x
′
1β1 + r
′
1γ1 + η1 > 0
)
...
IJ = 1
(
t∑
u=1
αJ(u)U(u) + x
′
JβJ + r
′
JγJ + ηJ > 0
) (10)
where U(u), with u = 1, . . . , t, denotes a set of t mutually exclusive dummy variables
defining ‘types’ membership, so that the αj coefficients can be interpreted as random
intercepts with a semiparametric discrete specification, like in Heckman and Singer (1984).
Since no underlying structure is imposed on U , the α’s can capture in a unrestrictive way
any variable which affects insurance choices after conditioning on w, and thus take into
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account the potential residual heterogeneity. (η1, . . . , ηJ) can be seen as idiosyncratic errors,
which are uncorrelated since, in the spirit of finite mixture models, U makes I1, . . . , IJ
conditional independent. In this sense, comparing (10) and (4), the finite mixture model
decomposes residual risk preferences heterogeneity by “uncovering” the deep types which
systematically affect insurance choices. Again using a standard logit link function to model
the conditional probabilities Pr(Ij = 1|u,xj , rj), the equation system above can be written
in terms of loglinear parameters as:
λI1 =
t∑
u=1
α1(u)U(u) + x
′
1β1 + r
′
1γ1
...
λIJ =
t∑
u=1
αJ(u)U(u) + x
′
JβJ + r
′
JγJ
(11)
To ensure that the membership probabilities lie between zero and one and sum to one, it
is convenient to use a multinomial logit parameterization such that:
P (U = u) = exp(αU (u))∑t
u=1 exp(αU (u))
, αU (m) = 0, u = 1, . . . ,m. (12)
Notice that them−1 logit parameters αU are simply reparameterizations of the membership
probabilities, and do not impose any parametric restriction on the distribution of U .
As discussed in the previous section in order to achieve sharper classification into risk
groups of unobserved risk preferences, following Cutler et al. (2008) and Einav et al. (2012),
we obtain identifying variation by using a set of H observable binary variables z acting
as indicators of U (that is, observable manifestations of the unobserved risk preferences
heterogeneity which affects insurance choices). Thus, we may set an auxiliary system
of equations, which is estimated jointly with the main equation 11 and the membership
probability equation 12 to help identification of the heterogeneous types. The auxiliary
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system of equations can then be written as
λz1 =
t∑
u=1
αz1(u)U(u)
...
λzH =
t∑
u=1
αzH (u)U(u)
(13)
where λzh is the logit describing the univariate distribution zh conditional on the unob-
served types U . However the system above does not allow for non-preference factors to be
identified. Thus we also include together with equations 11-13, a set of parameters devoted
to capture conditional on U residual correlation among insurance purchase decisions. In
the same fashion of the multivariate logit model (cfr. 7), this can be written in terms of
log-odds ratios as:
λIj ,Ik = log
(
Pr(Ij=0,Ik=0|U)Pr(Ij=1,Ik=1|U)
Pr(Ij=1,Ik=0|U)Pr(Ij=0,Ik=1|U)
)
= αIj ,Ik (14)
Therefore the discrete multivariate finite mixture model is defined by the main equation
(11), the membership probability equation (12), the auxiliary equation (13) and the set of
residual association parameters (14). It can be seen as an instance of a discrete multivari-
ate MIMIC model (see Huang and Bandeen-Roche (2004) for a recent general treatment).
Differently to the MIMIC model, the residual heterogeneity U is not a continuous uni-
variate variable on the real line, but an unstructured variable, where residual association
conditional on U is implemented using some recent developments in LCA and marginal
modelling (Bartolucci and Forcina 2006; and Dardanoni and Li Donni 2012).3 Finally note
that equation (9), which is key to testing the DGC, can be implemented by setting a sys-
tem of linear inequalities constraints in the αs of system (11). As explained for example
3Estimation of this model is implemented by EM algorithm; details on estimation and model identifia-
bility are reported in Dardanoni and Li Donni (2012).
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in Bartoloucci and Forcina (2006), this requires techniques of order restricted inference
to show that the likelihood ratio test statistic for the monotonicity null is asymptotically
distributed as a mixture of chi-squared distributions for which Kodde and Palm (1986)
provide bounds on the test distribution.4 We will now discuss each of these sets of results
below.
4 Results
Our extended latent class model (section 3.2) builds on and extends the multivariate logit
model described in section 3.1. As described in these sections, the motivation for our ex-
tended latent class model arises from a limitation of the multivariate logit in that we cannot
distinguish between the influence of context specificity (non-preference related factors) and
domain generality of risk preferences on purchasing insurance. Thus our discussion of re-
sults focuses on the extended latent class approach.5
We begin our discussion of the results by selecting the optimal number of latent classes
for our model. Table 2 presents the Schwartz’s Bayesian Information Criterion for model
selection generated by maximizing the log-likelihood L(υ) BICψ = −2L(ψ) + υlog(n),
where n denotes sample size and υ represents the number of parameters. The BIC values
do not provide sufficient improvement in favor of the 4-class model as compared to the 3-
class model and show that 3 classes are adequate to represent the unobserved heterogeneity
in P∗. We thus focus on the results of the 3-class model specification. The proportions of
individuals in each of the three classes are very similar lying between the 35% and 30% of
4Gourieroux and Monfort (1995) provide a detailed analysis on testing procedure when inequality con-
straints are involved.
5Results of the multivariate logit model are not presented here but are available on request. In general
the direction and magnitudes of the estimated effects of covariates on the insurance purchase probability
are very similar to those presented below.
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the first and third classes respectively.6
Table 3 reports the coefficients of the individual specific characteristics and ex-post
risk indicators (section 2.1) for each insurance purchase equation. As discussed in the
data and variables section, each insurance purchase decision is modeled using relevant
risk variables as controls. The results allow us to discuss the determinants of each of the
insurance categories. We find that purchasers of supplemental health insurance are more
likely to be women and less likely to be smokers. Individuals with greater likelihoods of
using healthcare in the future as determined by our proxies for observed ex post risk are
also more likely to possess supplemental health insurance. This is not surprising as people
who are riskier tend to use more health care resources - for example the coefficients on
doctors visits and outpatient services are positive and statistically significantly, and hence
more likely to buy additional coverage. Therefore our result on ex-post risk occurrence
follows earlier studies in their finding that the existence of selection effects in the Medigap
market related to private information on individual actual risk (see for example Fang et
al. 2008). In modeling the decision to purchase long-term care insurance, we have as
discussed earlier included variables that capture activities of daily living. We find that the
log-odds of owning long-term care insurance is an increasing function of poor health with
those with those unable to perform greater number of activities of daily living being more
likely purchase long-term care insurance. We also find that being married is statistically
significant in determining purchase of long-term insurance. Amongst the four types of
insurance purchase decisions, we find that only in the case of life insurance are women less
likely than men to possess insurance. We also find that individuals diagnosed with health
conditions are more likely to possess life-insurance.
As discussed in the earlier section our aim was to identify groups reflecting degrees of
6We present the main results of the other two latent class models in the Appendix B available online.
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risk aversion. In table 4 we present the estimated probabilities for insurance ownership and
risk tolerance indicators that enable us to study the characteristics of the three groups.
These probabilities are estimated using the α parameters presented in tables 5 and 6.
Focusing first on panel A, in general we find differences across all three types of individuals
except in the ownership of life insurance. We find that individuals in the first group are the
most risk averse and hence are more likely to own supplemental health insurance, long-term
insurance and annuities when compared with either of the other two groups. In contrast
group 3 emerges as the least risk averse and these individuals are in general two times less
likely to possess any of these types of insurance when compared with group 1 or 2. In the
case of life insurance we find all three groups are equally likely to show ownership. Thus
conditional on predicted and ex-post realized risk the attitudes towards insurance purchase
decisions varies across latent classes.
In panel B the risk tolerance proxy indicators show clear differences between the three
groups. In keeping with the results of panel A, individuals more likely to be employed
in jobs with lower mortality risks (job-mort) and more likely not to invest in risky T
bills in their own financial portfolios, are likely to belong to group 1 rather than group
3. This group is also more likely to have individuals who invest in preventive health care
(preventive) when compared with group 1 or group 2 individuals. Group 1 individuals
also have higher levels of education than the median. Compared to group 3 they are also
more likely to be of normal weight and participate in regular physical activities (healthb).
However, a greater proportion of Type 1 individuals are likely to change employment more
frequently than the median as compared to either of the other two types. One characteristic
stands out about type 3 is that they are least optimistic about life expectancy. This
outcome can also be potentially linked to the health behaviours. Type 3 individuals are
the least likely to invest in preventive health care or participate in regular physical exercise
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or maintain a health weight.
These results indicate two main conclusions. First, the estimated probabilities suggest
that, after conditioning on individual predicted and ex-post realized risk, there exits an
important source of heterogeneity in the underlying risk preferences represented by the
latent classes. Second the latent risk groups differing in their attitudes towards risk seem
to follow the same pattern across domains which are similar. Individuals who are risk averse
in one domain are also risk averse in other similar domains. We see this pattern for three
of our four insurance types - supplemental health insurance, long-term care insurance and
annuities. The exception is life-insurance which by definition is a different kind of insurance
purchase choices for which we see little difference across the three groups.
As discussed in the earlier sections our paper tries to answer three questions. The
above discussion addresses the first question relating to - the extent to which there is
unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences. We now address the second question about
domain general components in risk preferences. As detailed in equation (8) we test for the
presence of a single latent variable that conditional on predicted and realized risk has a
common effect on insurance choice domains. Formally, this is a test for unidimensionality
of the latent variable. This is a likelihood ratio test for the model under the null that
α
Ij
1 ≤ αIj2 ≤ αIj3 (with j = 1, . . . , 4) in table 5. The LR test statistic equals 0.21. Since
P ∗ has three levels (m = 3) and there are four insurance choices, the conservative 1%
critical value with 8 df is equal to 25.370 (Kodde and Palm 1986, page 1246); thus, the
null of domain general components cannot be rejected indicating the existence of a single
underlying unobservable variables which affects each insurance purchase decision.
We now move on to the third objective of our paper - to analyze whether insurance
purchase decisions are influenced by non-preference factors such as context-specificity. The
existence of a general commonality of domain risk preferences has been shown earlier, in this
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section we show that after conditioning on individual unobserved types and individual risk,
there still exists non-preference based correlation, which renders some insurance choices
more related than others. As described in the methodology section, we focus on the
residual correlation defined by the global log-odds ratios that show the association between
error terms of each of the insurance equations conditional on individual unobserved types
and individual risk. In table 7 we present the residual correlation parameters. In general
we see statistically significant strong association between three types of insurance. The
highest correlation of 0.7 is between supplemental health insurance and long-term care
insurance, followed by annuities and long-term care insurance. As reflected in our earlier
discussion of the patterns in the choices of insurance purchased, we see this also reflected
in the residual correlations. Life-insurance has a positive but generally lower association
with the other three types of insurance. This result is similar to by Einav et al. (2012)
and support the idea that choice is driven both by context and by individuals’ degree of
risk aversion.7
5 Conclusion
In this paper we examined the relationship between unobserved risk preferences and insur-
ance purchase decision and in particular how general are preferences for risk across domains.
Standard economic theory assumes that individuals risk preferences are context-invariant.
The validity of this principle has motivated a large literature in microeconometrics. To
study this issue in the insurance multiple demand, we follow a recent stream of papers by
Cohen and Einav (2007), Barseghyan et al. (2011) and Einav et al. (2012) which focus on
how general are individual risk preferences. Einav et al. (2012) used residual correlation
7However it is possible that unpriced risk might also contribute to the estimated residual correlations.
We have allowed for a rich set of risk occurrence proxy variables used in the literature (see section 2.1), but
elements of unpriced risk not captured by these variables might still contribute to the observed correlation.
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across insurance domains conditioning on predicted (by insurer) and ex-post risk to test
whether individuals show the same willingness to bear risk across domains.
In our setting we model the correlation between insurance choices using a LCA ap-
proach. Conditioning on predicted and realized risk we exploit LCA to identify individual
risk aversion throughout a set of auxiliary variables which are likely to capture individ-
ual risk preferences. In addition we also allow for residual association between insurance
choices in order to capture any residual correlation related to non-preference factors.
Using data from the HRS we study four insurance purchase decisions: Medigap in-
surance, log-term insurance, life insurance and annuity. In our data we identify three
unobserved types which different risk aversion. We find that individual buying insurance
in one domain are also more likely to buy another insurance, supporting the DGC of risk
preferences. However context is also important since conditional on unobserved risk pref-
erences, similar insurance choices seem to be more correlated. Therefore heterogeneity in
risk preferences is an important factor to consider in the demand for insurance and the
existence of residual correlation still remains an interesting question for further exploration.
References
Barseghyan, L., Prince, J., & Teitelbaum, J. C. (2011). Are risk preferences stable across
contexts? evidence from insurance data. American Economic Review, 101 (2), 591–631.
Barsky, R. B., Juster, F. T., Kimball, M. S., & Shapiro, M. D. (1997). Preference pa-
rameters and behavioral heterogeneity: An experimental approach in the health and
retirement study. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (2), 537–579.
Bartolucci, F., Colombi, R., & Forcina, A. (2007). An extended class of marginal link func-
24
tions for modelling contingency tables by equality and inequality constraints. Statistica
Sinica, 17 (2), 691.
Bartolucci, F. & Forcina, A. (2006). A class of latent marginal models for capture-recapture
data with continuous covariates. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 101,
786–794.
Cawley, J. & Philipson, T. (1999). An empirical examination of information barriers to
trade in insurance. The American Economic Review, 89 (4), 827–846.
Cohen, A. & Einav, L. (2007). Estimating risk preferences from deductible choice. American
Economic Review, 97 (3), 745–788.
Cohen, A. & Spiegelman, P. (2010). Testing for adverse selection in insurance markets.
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 77 (1), 39–84.
Cutler, D. M., Finkelstein, A., & McGarry, K. (2008). Preference Heterogeneity and
Insurance Markets: Explaining a Puzzle of Insurance. American Economic Review,
98 (2), 157–162.
Dardanoni, V., Forcina, A., & Li Donni, P. (2014). Testing For Asymmetric Information
In Insurance Markets: A Multivariate Ordered Regression Approach. Technical report,
mimeo.
Dardanoni, V. & Li Donni, P. (2012). Incentive and selection effects of medigap insurance
on inpatient care. Journal of Health Economics, 31 (3), 457 – 470.
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., Sunde, U., Schupp, J., & Wagner, G. G. (2011). Indi-
vidual risk attitudes: Measurement, determinants and behavioral. consequences. Journal
of the European Economic Association, 9 (3), 522–550.
25
Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Pascu, I., & Cullen, M. R. (2012). How general are risk pref-
erences? choices under uncertainty in different domains. American Economic Review,
102 (6), 2606–2638.
Fang, H., Keane, M. P., & Silverman, D. (2008). Sources of advantageous selection: Evi-
dence from the medigap insurance market. Journal of Political Economy, 116 (2), 303–
350.
Finkelstein, A. & McGarry, K. (2006). Multiple dimensions of private information: Evi-
dence from the long-term care insurance market. The American Economic Review, 96 (4),
938–958.
Finkelstein, A. & Poterba, J. (2004). Adverse selection in insurance markets: Policyholder
evidence from the u.k. annuity market. Journal of Political Economy, 112 (1), 183–208.
Finkelstein, A. & Poterba, J. (2014). Testing for asymmetric information using “unused
observables” in insurance markets: Evidence from the u.k. annuity market. Journal of
Risk and Insurance, Forthcoming.
Gourieroux, C. & Monfort, A. (1995). Statistics and econometric models. Cambridge
University Press.
Guiso, L. & Paiella, M. (2005). The role of risk aversion in predicting individual behavior.
Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 546, Bank of Italy, Economic Research
Department.
Guiso, L. & Paiella, M. (2008). Risk aversion, wealth, and background risk. Journal of the
European Economic Association, 6 (6), 1109–1150.
Heckman, J. & Singer, B. (1984). A method for minimizing the impact of distributional
assumptions in econometric models for duration data. Econometrica, 52 (2), 271–320.
26
Huang, G.-H. & Bandeen-Roche, K. (2004). Building an identifiable latent class model with
covariate effects on underlying and measured variables. Psychometrika, 69 (1), 5–32.
Inkmann, J. & Michaelides, A. (2012). Can the life insurance market provide evidence for
a bequest motive? Journal of Risk and Insurance, 79 (3), 671–695.
Kahneman, D. (2003a). Maps of bounded rationality: Psychology for behavioral economics.
American economic review, 93 (5), 1449–1475.
Kahneman, D. (2003b). A psychological perspective on economics. American Economic
Review, 93 (2), 162–168.
Kimball, M. S., Sahm, C. R., & Shapiro, M. D. (2008). Imputing risk tolerance from survey
responses. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 103 (483), 1028–1038.
Kodde, D. A. & Palm, F. C. (1986). Wald criteria for jointly testing equality and inequality
restriction s. Econometrica, 54 (5), 1243–48.
Rabin, M. (2000). Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: A calibration theorem. Econo-
metrica, 68 (5), 1281–1292.
Rabin, M. & Thaler, R. H. (2001). Anomalies: Risk aversion. The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 15 (1), 219–232.
Viscusi, W. K. (2004). The value of life: Estimates with risks by occupation and industry.
Economic Inquiry, 42 (1), 29–48.
27
A Tables
Table 1: Sample Characteristics and Variable Definition
Variable Definition of Binary Variables Mean Std. Dev.
Insurance Status
Sup. Health Ins. 1 = enrolled in any health insurance (Medigap). 0.496 0.50
Long-Term Ins. 1 = enrolled in any log-term insurance. 0.123 0.33
Life Ins 1 = covered by life insurance. 0.597 0.49
Annuity 1 = has an annuity. 0.043 0.20
Controls used by insurer
age individual age. 7.429 0.67
female 1 = female. 0.605 0.49
smoke 1 = currently a smokers. 0.100 0.30
married 1 = married. 0.559 0.50
spouse age spouse age 4.149 3.59
mar*spage interaction between spouse and whether married 4.026 3.62
adl # of Activities of daily living (ADLs) 0.298 0.82
iadl # of Instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs) 0.125 0.47
disease # of doctor’s diagnosed diseases 2.079 1.32
stated1 1 = census division New England Division 0.043 0.20
stated2 1 = census division Middle Atlantic Division 0.131 0.34
stated3 1 = census division East North Central Division 0.154 0.36
stated4 1 = census division West North Central Division 0.094 0.29
stated5 1 = census division South Atlantic Division 0.226 0.42
stated6 1 = census division East South Central Division 0.051 0.22
stated7 1 = census division West South Central Division 0.096 0.29
stated8 1 = census division Mountain Division 0.062 0.24
stated9 1 = census division Pacific Division 0.144 0.35
Ex-post Risk Indicators
mortality 1 = died in the subsequent 2004-2006. 0.093 0.29
doctor # of doctor visits during 2004-2006. 10.657 4.30
hospital # of hospital inpatient staying during 2004-2006. 0.613 0.71
oth.services # of outpatient health care service during 2004-2006. 0.581 0.74
nursing home # entered in any nursing home in 2004-2006. 0.127 0.39
Risk Preference Indicators
healthb 1 = has regular physical activity, normal weight and no drinking
problems.
0.756 0.43
preventive 1 = received sex-adjusted preventive care. 0.535 0.50
job-mort 1 = has a job-based mortality risk lower than the median. 0.360 0.48
job-num 1 = has a number of jobs lower than the median. 0.502 0.50
no-risky-assets 1 = holds no risk asset such as T-bills. 0.274 0.45
education 1 = number of year of education higher than the median 0.313 0.46
prlife 1 = subjective life expectation greater than the median. 0.539 0.50
28
Table 2: Model Selection Criteria for System of Equations 11-14
Number of Latent Classes
2LC 3LC 4LC
L(ψ) -26825.617 -26676.765 -26638.138
BIC(ψ) 54220.195 54022.895 54046.046
# of parameters 68 80 92
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Table 3: Extend LC Model Estimated β Parameters
Variables 3LC
Coef. St.Er.
Sup. Health Ins.
age -0.567 (1.14)
age2 0.0454 (0.07)
female 0.174** (0.07)
smoke -0.281** (0.11)
stated2 -0.277 (0.18)
stated3 0.915*** (0.18)
stated4 0.709*** (0.19)
stated5 -0.269 (0.17)
stated6 0.535** (0.21)
stated7 0.0821 (0.19)
stated8 -0.820*** (0.21)
stated9 -0.904*** (0.18)
doctor 0.0301*** (0.01)
hospital 0.0466 (0.05)
oth. service 0.134*** (0.05)
nursing home -0.208** (0.09)
Log-Term Ins.
age 0.706 (1.73)
age2 -0.0531 (0.11)
fem 0.115 (0.10)
nursing home 0.234* (0.13)
married 0.387*** (0.11)
adl -0.115 (0.08)
disease -0.0617 (0.04)
iad -0.268* (0.15)
Life Ins.
age 0.890 (1.10)
age2 -0.0768 (0.07)
female -0.408*** (0.07)
married 0.124* (0.07)
adl -0.0594 (0.04)
disease 0.0886*** (0.03)
iadl -0.156** (0.08)
mortality -0.145 (0.11)
Annuity
age 3.242 (2.64)
age2 -0.190 (0.17)
female 0.0521 (0.18)
married -2.542* (1.36)
mortality 0.0525 (0.24)
spouse age -0.0984 (0.11)
mar*spage 0.396* (0.21)
*,**,*** denote statistical significance at the
10, 5, 1% level, respectively
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Table 4: Estimated Probabilities of Extended LC Model
3LC
M=1 M=2 M=3
Panel A: Main Eq.
Sup. Health Ins. 0.5766 0.5494 0.3406
Long-Term Ins. 0.1901 0.1335 0.0297
Life Ins. 0.5903 0.6041 0.595
Annuity 0.0747 0.0392 0.0125
Panel B: Auxiliary Ind.
No-risky-assets 0.3304 0.3466 0.1223
Job-mort 0.6743 0.0686 0.3250
Job-num 0.2966 0.8317 0.3649
Education 0.5731 0.2583 0.0697
Healthb 0.7738 0.7946 0.6913
Preventive 0.6335 0.5569 0.3934
Prlife 0.3769 0.8930 0.3235
Table 5: Estimated Intercepts α of Equation System 11
Insurance 3LC
Choice Coef. St.Er.
Sup. Health Ins.
αI11 -0.0983 (0.19)
αI12 -0.220 (0.19)
αI13 -1.168*** (0.21)
αI14
Log-Term Ins.
αI21 -1.599*** (0.16)
αI22 -2.024*** (0.16)
αI23 -3.649*** (0.43)
αI24
Life Ins.
αI31 0.412*** (0.11)
αI32 0.471*** (0.11)
αI33 0.431*** (0.12)
αI34
Annuity
αI41 -1.212 (0.80)
αI42 -1.900** (0.81)
αI43 -3.077*** (0.95)
αI44
*,**,*** denote statistical significance
at the 10, 5, 1% level, respectively
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Table 6: Estimated Intercepts α of Equation System 13
Indicators 3LC
Coef. St.Er.
Norass
αH11 -0.707*** (0.08)
αH12 -0.634*** (0.07)
αH13 -1.971*** (0.18)
αH14
Job-mort
αH21 0.727*** (0.12)
αH22 -2.609*** (0.27)
αH23 -0.731*** (0.11)
αH24
Job-num
αH31 -0.863*** (0.09)
αH32 1.598*** (0.16)
αH33 -0.554*** (0.10)
αH34
Education
αH41 0.294** (0.12)
αH42 -1.055*** (0.08)
αH43 -2.591*** (0.44)
αH54
Healthb
αH51 1.230*** (0.08)
αH52 1.353*** (0.08)
αH53 0.806*** (0.09)
αH54
Preventive
αH61 0.547*** (0.08)
αH62 0.229*** (0.07)
αH63 -0.433*** (0.10)
αH64
Prlife
αH71 -0.503*** (0.08)
αH72 2.122*** (0.24)
αH73 -0.738*** (0.13)
αH74
*,**,*** denote statistical significance
at the 10, 5, 1% level, respectively
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Table 7: Extend LC Model’s Estimated Parameters of Equation System 14
Sup. Health Ins. Long-Term Ins. Life Ins.
Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er.
3LC
Long-Term Ins. 0.685*** (0.11)
Life Ins. 0.081 (0.07) 0.331*** (0.11)
Annuity 0.433** (0.17) 0.506** (0.20) 0.251 (0.16)
*,**,*** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1% level, respectively
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B Tables: all classes
This section is not intended for publication.
Table 8: Model Selection Criteria for System of Equations 11-14
Number of Latent Classes
2LC 3LC 4LC
L(ψ) -26825.617 -26676.765 -26638.138
BIC(ψ) 54220.195 54022.895 54046.046
# of parameters 68 80 92
Table 9: Estimated Class Membership Probabilities
2LC 3LC 4LC
Pr(U = 1) 0.4021 0.3544 0.1609
Pr(U = 2) 0.5979 0.3454 0.2747
Pr(U = 3) . 0.3002 0.3611
Pr(U = 4) . . 0.2027
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Table 10: Estimated Probabilities of Extended LC Model
2LC 3LC 4LC
M=1 M=2 M=1 M=2 M=3 M=1 M=2 M=3 M=4
Panel A: Main Eq.
Sup. Health Ins. 0.4874 0.5025 0.5766 0.5494 0.3406 0.8370 0.5002 0.3411 0.502
Log-Term Ins. 0.1036 0.1351 0.1901 0.1335 0.0297 0.1931 0.1239 0.0437 0.2028
Life Ins. 0.5967 0.5964 0.5903 0.6041 0.595 0.6873 0.5965 0.5904 0.5362
Annuity 0.0326 0.0542 0.0747 0.0392 0.0125 0.0698 0.0400 0.0161 0.0767
Panel B: Auxiliary Ind.
Norass 0.3118 0.2478 0.3304 0.3466 0.1223 0.5703 0.3171 0.1174 0.2570
Job-mort 0.0778 0.5502 0.6743 0.0686 0.3250 0.4132 0.0448 0.3626 0.7417
Job-num 0.8161 0.2907 0.2966 0.8317 0.3649 0.4022 0.8922 0.3678 0.2908
Education 0.2253 0.3724 0.5731 0.2583 0.0697 0.2988 0.2683 0.0779 0.8049
Healthb 0.7760 0.7429 0.7738 0.7946 0.6913 0.8033 0.7917 0.7010 0.7690
Preventive 0.5245 0.5420 0.6335 0.5569 0.3934 0.6539 0.5419 0.4266 0.6244
Prlife 0.8273 0.3454 0.3769 0.8930 0.3235 0.4864 0.9561 0.3406 0.3692
Table 11: Extend LC Model’s Estimated Parameters of Equation System 14
Sup. Health Ins. Long-Term Ins. Life Ins.
Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er.
2LC
Long-Term Ins. 0.893*** (0.10)
Life Ins. 0.075 (0.07) 0.311*** (0.10)
Annuity 0.624*** (0.16) 0.749*** (0.18) 0.239 (0.15)
3LC
Log-Term Ins. 0.685*** (0.11)
Life Ins. 0.081 (0.07) 0.331*** (0.11)
Annuity 0.433** (0.17) 0.506** (0.20) 0.251 (0.16)
4LC
Log-Term Ins. 0.684*** (0.14)
Life Ins. 0.020 (0.09) 0.327*** (0.11)
Annuity 0.388* (0.21) 0.497** (0.20) 0.244 (0.16)
*,**,*** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1% level, respectively
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